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Abstract
In many professons employees are rewarded according to their relative performance.
Corresponding economy can be modeled by taking N independent agents who gain
from the market with a rate which depends on their current gain. We argue that
this simple realistic rate generates a scale free distribution even though intrinsic
ability of agents are marginally different from each other. As an evidence we provide
distribution of scores for two different systems (a) the global stock game where
players invest in real stock market and (b) the international cricket.
1 Introduction
In equilibrium systems power law distributions are observed at the critical-
ity. Many open and driven systems in nature, however, naturally self organize
to produce scale free distributions[1]. Distribution of rain fall, magnitude of
earthquake, link distribution of world wide web are few examples to men-
tion. The scale invariant distributions are also seen in social and economic
systems[2]. About a century ago Vilferdo Pareto pointed out that wealth w in
any society is distributes as P (w) = w−γ. Several attempts have been made
earlier to understand this phenomena, namely ’the Pareto-law for the wealthy
people’[3]. An interesting analogy has been drawn [4] between the economic
system and the system of ideal gases where particles and their energies are
modelled as agent and their wealth, and redistribution of energy during col-
lision is modelled as trading between agents. This analogy, which naturally
generate Gibb’s distribution, could successfully explain 97% of the observed
income distribution. The rich (about 3%), however, follow a scale-free distri-
bution which was explained later [5] using ideal-gas like models.
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In this article we argue that economy works differently at different levels. In
particular for rich and successful it is quite a different game. There are certain
kind of occupations, for example the law, the medicine and the journalism,
market pays individuals not according to their absolute performance, but ac-
cording to their performance relative to others in the same occupation. The
same is true in the sports, share and entertainment industries. These sys-
tems where ”winner plays an important role in the market” may be named as
celebrity markets (CM)[6].
How does a system (or market) generates a successful professional or celebrity
? Of course, there are exceptionally brilliant and strategic individuals who
play and controls the market. But often, strategy of players or agents in the
market are not very different from each other. However, the distribution of
their success or wealth is highly asymmetric with power law tails, where most
become unsuccessful and only a few become successful. To understand this
phenomena we introduce a simple model of N agents in section 2. In section 3
the theoretical results are compared in certain example systems belongs to this
class, namely celebrity markets. Finally the conclusion and some discussions
are given in section 4.
2 The model
Let us take an unbiased sample of N agents, labeled by i = 1, 2, . . . , N , who
invests equal amount in the market (say, stock market). The net gain of the
agents{mi} are taken to be integers for simplicity and set {mi = 0} at time
t = 0. In each time step dt a randomly chosen agent j first decides with
probability z, if he wants to continue investing. With probability 1−z the agent
become inactive forever. If active, the net gain of the agent mj is increased by
unity, with a probability w(mj). Of course, {w(mj)} are normalized such that
total probability of all active agents is unity.
It is reasonable to assume that the growth rate of agents w(m) depends on the
the instantaneous gain m and that w(m) is an increasing function. Because,
if mj(t) > mi(t), agent j can be considered strategically smarter (who studies
the market better) than agent i at time t and thus w(mj) > w(mi).
Note that, there is no direct interection between agents. The only interaction
comes from the fact that the growth rate is relative. Thus our model is an en-
semble of N independent agents where wealth m of an agent follows a discrete
time dynamics
(m− 1)
zw(m)
−→ m, (1)
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where w(m) is an increasing function. Depending on their asymptotic limits,
increasing functions may be classified into two categories; (a) when w(∞) is∞
and (b) w(∞) is finite (say, unity). It is obvious that for case (a), the growth
rate w(m) for the smartest agent, chosen stochastically by the process, is large
compared to the rest and thus he predictively wins the market. In the second
case, where w(m) is a marginally increasing function, probability of gaining an
extra unit is comparable among agents, which mimics the cometition existing
in real markets. Moreover, we have assumed that the agents are strategically
similar and thus choice (b) is more appropriate.
Since agents are independent, Prob.({mi}) =
∏
i p(mi), where p(m) is the
probability that an agent gains m unit of wealth. To gain m units, one must
go through the process 0→ 1, 1→ 2, . . . (m−1)→ m, which occurs with rate
w(1), w(2) . . .w(m) respectively. Thus the normalized probability is,
p(m) =
zm
∏m
k=1w(k)
F (z)
where F (z) = p(0) +
∑
m=1
zm
m∏
k=1
w(k). (2)
The average gain ρ(z) = 〈m〉 = zF ′(z)/F (z) is monotonically increases start-
ing from ρ(0) = 0. Since maximum value of z is 1 (when agents keep on
investing indefinitely), the maximum average gain is ρ(1). If ρ(1) = ∞, one
can fix any arbitrary density by suitably choosing z. But when ρ(1) is finite,
say ρ(1) = ρc, it is impossible to have uniform macroscopic density ρ > ρc.
Thus in this case, the extra gain (ρ − ρc)N would be owned only by one or
few agents. In next section we will discuss about such a possibility, namely
the condensation of wealth.
2.1 Condensation ?
Let us take z = 1. Then agents do not have a choice but to invest indefinitely.
Let us further impose an condition that the agents keep on investing until
total gain becomes
∑
mi =M . Now, the partition function of an ensemble of
systems with total gain M being conserved is then
QM =
M∏
k=1
w(k). (3)
One may consider (3) as a canonical partition function and clearly (2) rep-
resents the grand canonical partition function of this system with fugacity
z.
In this canonical ensemble one can choose the density ρ = M/N arbitrarily
large. When ρ > ρc, with ρc being finite, we have extra wealth (ρ − ρc)N
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which can not be distributed macroscopically. Some agent(s) would gain this
macroscopic amount. It can be argued[7] that in the thermodynamic limit,
wealth would preferably go to one agent instead being distributed between
few agents.
The possibility of having condensation (or a super celebrity) depends on the
rate w(k). First we need that ρc = limz→1
zF ′(z)
F (z)
is finite. Since F (z) is analytic
for z < 1, we must check whether zF ′(z) =
∑
∞
1 mz
mQm is finite as z → 1.
This series will converge, when ratio of successive terms decay more slowly
than 1+1/m. Thus asymptotically w(m) should increase faster than 1−2/m.
It is evident from the Taylor’s series of w(m) = 1 − w1/m − w2/m
2 . . . that
condensation would occur when w1 > 2.
To demonstrate the condensation, let us make a simple choice
w(m) = m/(m+ b) (4)
which is a marginally increasing function. In this case w1 = b and thus con-
densation occurs for large density ρ > ρc, if b > 2. To calculate ρc, first note
that
Qm =
Γ(m+ 1)Γ(b+ 1)
Γ(m+ b+ 1)
(5)
Thus, F (1) = b/(b−1) and F ′(1) = F (1)/(b−2) and hence, ρc = F
′(1)/F (1) =
(b− 2)−1.
Any other choice of rate where coefficient of m−1 in Taylor’s series of w(m)
is −b is similar to (4) except that ρc is different from (b− 2)
−1. Thus we will
continue further discussions with choice (4) .
Distribution of wealth can be obtained from (5). Asymptotically, Q(m) ∝ m−b.
Thus, up to a normalization constant F (z)−1,
p(m) = zmQ(m) = zmm−b. (6)
Note that p(m) is similar to observed economic distribution: an exponential
distribution for small m and a power-law in the tail.
From (6) one can show that 〈m〉 diverges for b > 2 and thus, in this case
condensation occurs for sufficiently large densities. Since, many observed dis-
tributions follow Pareto law p(m) ∝ m−b with 2 < b < 3, condenseation of
wealth is expected in these economic systems if per capita income (i. e., the
density ρ) is very large. Condensation in economic systems has been observed
4
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Fig. 1. Probability of gaining more than k% in global stock game[9]: (A) Group
of K-12 students (total373 members, started in January, 2006, starting wealth is
$10,000 per student). (B) Group of 1294 members, started in January 2005, starting
wealth is $666666666 per person.
and modelled earlier[8]. It was argued that the macroscopic accumulation may
be viewed as existing corruptions in societies. Here, we show that such a phe-
nomena can occur naturally in CMs.
3 Evidence
As we have discussed earlier, in many occupations, like the medicine the jour-
nalism, the share trading and in the entertainment industries like the sports
and the film industries, ”winner takes all the market”. In this section we would
cite some examples which are close to the model discussed here.
3.1 Global stock game
Let us take an hypothetical example where brokers invest the same amount
of money in stock market. What would be the distribution of their net gain ?
It is difficult to carry out such a controlled experiment where (real) money is
involved. However a prototype experiment is an existing game, namely global
stock game (gsg)[9]. When a group joins this game they get a fixed amount of
gsg dollars to make transactions in the real stock market (NSE) and individual
NAV is evaluated. If these money would have been real the player could have
earned the NAV. This game is usually played by (A) a group of school/college
students as an learing exercise or (B) by a group of brokers to get experienced
in thereal stock market without loosing money. We have collected data for
both the groups.
Group A : We have combined two group of K-12 students and calculated the
5
mp(m)
ODI
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 100  1000  10000
p(m)
TEST
m
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 100  1000  10000
Fig. 2. Distribution of runs: (ODI) The one day international cricket, played by
21 countries having 1620 players; (TEST) The test cricket which is played by 10
countries with 2482 players. Data is collected from http://www.howstat.com.
percentage of gain m. If probability of net gain p(m) ∼ m−b, the probability
of gaining more than k% is P (k) ∼ k−b+1. Thus, from the plot of P (k) versus
k in log scale one can obtain b. Condensation is expected for b > 2. In this
case, P (k) do not vanish for large k and a correct fitting function is P (k) =
c1 + c2k
−b+1. In fact for group A (see Fig. 1) we find b = 2.10 ± .05, with
c1 = 0.06 and c2 = 1.35.
Group B : This a single group of 1294 members joined to win the contest
money666. For this group we find (see Fig. 1) that b = 1.43± .05, with c1 = 0
and c2 = 0.52.
Note the exponent b is different for different groups. A possible reason for group
A to have b > 2 is that it consists of beginners, where some learners are smarter
than others and play well enough to become the super celebrity. However group
B consists of exparts (probably) and thus nobody gains exceptionally different
from others, which explains the smaller value of b
3.2 International cricket
Another example is the score (e. g., run) of cricketers in international cricket,
a bat and ball sport played between two teams of eleven players each. Readers
unfamiliar with the game may look at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cricket for
details. In this example, let us take two cricketers who started playing about
the same time. Obviously one who scores better gets selected for the next
international match. Thus, the rate of increase of score w(k) is an increasing
function. Again, the difference between rates of two cricketers already having
huge runs is small and hence the choice (4)is reasonable.
We have collected life time score (run) of the international cricketers for both
one day international (ODI) and the test cricket. The calculated distribution
of runs p(m) are plotted in log scale (Fig. 2). Corresponding slopes are found
to be b = 1.3 ± .05 for ODI and b = 1.35 ± .05 for test. Since b < 2, we do
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not expect a super celebrity here. It means, we will never fine an exceptional
cricketer (both in ODI and in test cricket) who could score strikingly different
from others.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have introduced a model a markets, where agents (employees
or players) are rewarded according to their comparative performance. A player
who is successful at present has a better probability of being successful in
future. We show that this underlying mechanism ”success comes easily to
people who are already successful” generates a skew distribution even though
the ability of players are marginally different from each other. The model
successfully describes observation of wealth condensation in economic systems.
It also predicts that, in cricket, a brilliant performance which is strikingly
different from others, is not expected from any player.
This model is general enough to describe different systems having different
b. It would be nice to obtain data at different intermediate times so that
from the evolution of the net gain one can calculate w(k) and thus b directly.
Such studies would certainly justify the model better. There are many other
systems which are test ground for CM model. One example is the distribution
of citation of different papers (not authors) where a better cited article is
expected to get more citations in future. Another example is the distribution
of chromosomal changes per tumor[10] in different kinds of cancers which
show a power-law. Here, the mechanism is the following. A cell having more
aberrant chromosomesm, would generate daughter cells with more aberrations
compared to a cell having smaller m. Thus (4) is a reasonable choice.
It is worth noting that the CM model can be mapped to a well-known model in
non-equilibrium studies namely zero range process (ZRP)[11]. ZRP is defined
on a one dimensional periodic lattice with N sites and M particles initially
distributed randomly among sites. The dynamics of the model is as follows.
One particle is transfered from a randomly chosen site to it’s rightward neigh-
bour with a rate u(m) where m is the number of particles in the departure
site. It can be shown, that the steady state distribution of particles follow (5)
in canonical or (2) in grand canonical ensemble with w(m) = u(m)−1. The
condensation criteria of CM model is identical to that of the ZRP.
The celebrity market model introduced here can also be used to model anoma-
lous diffusion, which will be discussed elsewhere.
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